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vested rights of others, reversed the judgment of the trial Court
and remanded the case with directions to the trial Court to determine, upon the evidence already taken, together with any additional
evidence the parties may see fit to introduce, whether the change
of the point of diversion as prayed would injuriously affect the
vested rights of protestants, and, if so, whether such effect may be
prevented by the imposition of terms and conditions, and to enter
the Decree accordingly. The Supreme Court also stated that the
burden of proof on the petitioner in such a proceeding requires
him to meet only the grounds of injury to protestants asserted by
them, and that the evidence presented by the petitioner constituted
prima facie evidence to satisfy the burden of proof resting on the
petitioner.
OIL AND GAS

The only cases having to do with Oil and Gas are the cases
11
of Mitchell v. Espinosa 'o and Johnson v. McLaughlin,
and cover
the manner of creating mineral reservations and the effect thereof, and I believe have been reported upon by Mr. Rubright.
DAMAGES FOR SUBSIDENCE ACCOUNT REMOVAL OF COAL

Colorado Fuel and Iron Corporationv. Salardino:12 Action for
alleged damages to plaintiff's land and buildings caused by the
removal by the defendant, who owned the same, of coal deposits
underlying plaintiff's land and adjacent land in a careless, wrongful
and negligent manner. Defendant alleged that plaintiff's improvements were placed upon the surface property with full knowledge
of defendant's right to mine and remove the coal adjacent to or
underlying the same, and by so doing plaintiff assumed the risk
of damage to his property. Plaintiff recovered judgment in the
trial Court. The Supreme Court, in reversing the case, and ordering a new trial, held that a mine operator must leave support sufficient to maintain the surface in its natural state, but that negligence
on the part of the mine operator must be proved to recover for
damages to buildings erected upon the surface of the land.
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Mitchell v. Espinosa I is significant. A grantor reserved mineral rights in a deed. The mineral interest and the surface interest
were not thereafter separately assessed, but continued to be assessed as a unit. A later Treasurer's Deed for unpaid taxes subsequent to the severance was held not to convey a tax title to the
mineral interest. This case was commented upon in DICTA. 2 The
case also caused the Real Estate Title Standards Committee to pubP. 2d 412, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 243 (March 22, 1952).
243 P. 2d 812, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 259 (March 22, 1952).
12 245 P. 2d 461, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 367 (June 7, 1952).
'243 P. 2d 412, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 243 (March 17, 1952).
"29 DICTA 225 (June, 1952).
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lish a special note to Real Estate Title Standard No. 47.3 The effect of this note is that Title Standard No. 47 may not be applicable to a mineral estate which was severed prior to the tax
sale upon which the Treasurer's Deed was based. Another significant point determined in this case was that a tax deed is not void
even though executed and issued later than the date fixed in the
notice for the issuance of the Treasurer's Deed. The court overruled the former case of Tewell v. Galbraith.4 Attention is called
to the provisions of the 1951 Session Laws, Chap. 258, p. 726 which
permits a delay in the acknowledgment of the Treasurer's Deed and
which liberalizes the form by not requiring a statement when the
redemption period expires. The statute requires that the Treasurer's Deed shall be signed within five months from service of the
notice.
Hoff v. Armbruster 5 is a case where husband and wife executed identical wills at the same time. The husband died first and
his will was still in existence, although it was not probated. The
wife died later and the will was not found. Her estate was being administered as an intestate estate and a legatee under her will contended that the wills were mutual, reciprocal and irrevocable. The
plaintiffs were the beneficiaries under the will, and sought to impose a trust upon the assets of the decedent which otherwise would
have passed to her heirs-at-law under the intestacy statutes. The
court upheld the position of the beneficiaries under the will and
held that wills executed under circumstances existing in this case
were mutual, reciprocal and irrevocable. There was no express
agreement that the wills were irrevocable but the court found an
implied agreement to that effect. Because of the common practice
of drawing identical wills in order to provide against a common
disaster, this case indicates that extra precautions should be taken
to prescribe the conditions under which the survivor could change
the testamentary plan used in his own will. Some lawyers have
even suggested that in order to avoid an implied contract, which
the court found here, it would be well to have a contract in writing
prescribing exactly under what conditions the survivor could modify his will.
Gehm v. Brown 1 contains a caution to attorneys who have
been trusted friends or advisors of the testator and to whom the
testator is making a bequest. The case held that a presumption of
undue influence is raised where a real estate agent drew a will in
which he was made a beneficiary and the executor. It would appear
that many lawyers, because of close and confidential relationship
with clients might be caught in the same trap and the case indicates
that extreme care should be used by an attorney drawing a will
under those circumstances where he takes any interest under it.
For years lawyers have wondered whether or not a widow, in
'29 DICTA 331 (Sept, 1952).
4119 Colo. 412, 205 P. 2d 229 (1949).
'242 P. 2d 604, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Feb. 11, 1952).
6 245 P. 2d 865, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (June 2, 1952).
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addition to her statutory widow's allowance of $2000, might be
allowed a homestead exemption on real estate which was occupied7
by her as a home. The case of Wallace v. First National Bank,
decides that a widow may have both a widow's allowance and a
homestead exemption. The court also held that the widow could
occupy the home under her homestead during the period of administration. Attention is called to 1951 Session Laws, ch. 214, p. 522,
where the exemption is raised from $2,000 to $5,000.
Although the court, in Mitchell v. Espinosa supra, and in the
case of Johnson v. McLaughlin,8 evidenced a continuation of a
reasonable interpretation of the validity of tax deeds, Siler v. Investment Securities Co." indicates that a Treasurer's Deed may be
attacked where the Treasurer did not send notices to the proper
address of the fee title owner even though there was a current address in his office to which tax notices on other property had been
sent.
In Rochester v. Richards,0 the court discusses at some length
whether the word "and" or the word "or" will be supplied in place
of a comma between the name of the legatee and the following words
which were descriptive of the interest the legatee took. The case
would seem to indicate that a comma should never be used where
words of limitation are intended as in the following phrase: "to
Joe Doakes, his heirs and assigns," but rather the phrase should
read: Joe Doakes and his heirs and assigns." Likewise, if a substitution is intended, the phrase should substitute the word "or" instead of a comma-"to Joe Doakes or his heirs or assigns."

SURETYSHIP, INSURANCE AND TORTS
LOUIS G. ISAACSON
SURETYSHIP
Our Court has considered three cases on this subject, two of
them, Massachusetts Bonding Co. v. Central Finance I and Mass.
Bonding Co. v. Bank of Aurora,2 involving the relatively new motor
vehicle bonds. In the first of these cases, the attorneys who had entered an appearance for both the bonding company and the defaulting dealer permitted a judgment by default to be entered
against the dealer, and thereafter attempted to defend as to the
bonding company by showing that there was no evidence of fraud.
The Court held that the default judgment against the dealer resulted in an automatic judgment against the bonding company, being conclusive proof of the fraud necessary to recover on the bond.
In the second case, where the fraudulent transactions occurred
prior to the effective date of the bond but renewal notes and chattel
mortgages were taken thereafter, the Court denied recovery, hold246 P. 2d 894, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (June 16, 1952).

'242 P. 2d 812, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (March 17, 1952).
244 P. 2d 877, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (May 5, 1952).
10246 P. 2d 906, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (July 7, 1952).
1237 P. 2d 1079, 1951-2 C. B, A. Adv. Sh. (Oct. 15, 1951).
2 238 P. 2d 872, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Nov. 26, 1951).

